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Comments
INCLUSION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN GROSS
ESTATE UNDER FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION
In the decision of Fernandez v. Wiener1 the United States
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional Section 402 (b) (2) of
the 1942 revenue act, as applied to the estate of a Louisiana dece-
dent. That act, amending Section 811 (e) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, imposes an estate tax measured by the value of the
entire community upon the death of one of the spouses.2 While
giving effect to an attempt on the part of Congress to alleviate
an inequitable situation as far as the estate tax burden is con-
1. 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 147 (U.S. 1945). See also the case of United States
v. Rompel, 90 L.Ed. 163 (U.S. 1945), a case involving the application of Sec-
tion 402(b) (2) of the 1942 revenue act [56 Stat. 798 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(e)
(Supp. 1944)] in Texas, decided by the Supreme Court at the same time and
with the same result as the Wiener case.
2. 56 Stat. 798 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(e) (Supp. 1944).
[685]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cerned, the court gave scant heed to prior decisions concerning
taxation of community income 3 and left a serious doubt among
community property advocates as to the correctness of the ruling.
In considering the merits and implications of the decision,
it will first be necessary to gain some understanding of the na-
ture and importance of the issues involved. This can be accom-
plished only by a thorough consideration of the federal estate
tax provisions in the light of the Louisiana community property
system.
Issues involved
An estate tax is a form of death tax which is levied upon the
transmission of property .or property rights at death,' before the
administration of the estate. Under the current federal estate
tax, which has been in effect since September 8, 1916, the tax is
measured by the value of the decedent's "gross estate."
What actually constitutes a part of the gross estate often
presents many complex and confusing problems in considering
whether the deceased was owner of the property so that it might
be taxable to his estate. These problems can be settled only with
reference to the property laws of the state in which the deceased
was domiciled. As a consequence, the differences in theories
and property concepts in the various states have unevenly dis-
tributed this tax burden in the past. Perhaps the most obvious
example of this lack of uniformity has been the manner in which
the eight community property states have been favored under
Section 811 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides
that the gross estate shall include any interest held as "joint ten-
ants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the
entirety by deceased and spouse."
Since the community of acquets and gains existent in Louisi-
ana comprehends distinct, undivided interests in the spouses, as
distinguished from a "joint tenancy" or a "tenancy by the en-
3. Arnett v. Read, 220 U.S. 311, 31 S.Ct. 425, 55 L.Ed. 477 (1910); Bender
v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S.
118, 51 S.Ct. 62, 75 L.Ed. 247 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 51 S.Ct. 62,
75 L.Ed. 249 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239
(1930); Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206, 52 S.Ct. 120, 76 L.Ed. 248
(1931).
4. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 50 S.Ct. 46, 74 L.Ed. 226 (1929);
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 S.Ct. 761, 77 L.Ed. 1439 (1932).
5. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 50 S.Ct. 81, 74 L. Ed. 607 (1929);
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930); Freuler v. Hel-
vering, 291 U.S. 35, 54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634 (1933); Blair v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 33, 81 L.Ed. 469 (1937); Sharp v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 303 U.S. 624, 58 S.Ct. 748, 82 L.Ed. 1087 (1937),
[Vol. VI
COMMENTS
tirety," there had been included in the measure of the tax in
Louisiana and other community property states only one-half of
the property held as community. In the other states a tax is
collected upon the whole of the property held as tenants by the
entirety by the spouses.7 Due to the large basic exemption and
the steeply progressive rates of the tax, citizens of community
property states have not only been able to reduce the amount
which must be paid into the United States treasury, but have
been able, in a substantial number of cases, to avoid tax lia-
bility altogether.
In an effort to obviate this lack of uniformity, Congress
amended the revenue code in 1942, placing an additional para-
graph in Section 811 (e).18 This amendment stipulated that the
term "gross estate" would be expanded to cover
". . the extent of the interest therein held as community
property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law
of any state of the United States, except such part thereof
as may be shown to have been received as compensation for
personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse,
or derived originally from such compensation, or from sepa-
rate property of the surviving spouse."
Committee reports show that in so amending the revenue
code, Congress relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court
in Tyler v. United States9 and United States v. Jacobs ° (cases in
which the constitutionality of paragraph one had been upheld)
as an indication that this amendment would not be declared un-
constitutional. However, whether or not the court would actually
uphold the enactment under the same line of reasoning as had
been used to decide the Tyler and Jacobs cases remained, in the
minds of the students of the subject, a doubtful question.
It was hoped the Succession of Wiener,"' a case arising in the
Louisiana courts, involving the validity of Act 119 of 1932,12
6. For a discussion of the differences between joint tenancies, tenancies
by the entirety, and tenancies in common, see Tiffany, The Law of Real
Property (3 ed. 1939) § 418 et seq.
7. Certain allowances and deductions are made in these situations de-
pendent upon who paid for the property in question.
8. Revenue Act of 1942, § 402, 56 Stat. 798, c. 617, 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(e)
(Supp. 1944).
9. 281 U.S. 497, 50 S.Ct. 81, 74 L.Ed. 607 (1929).
10. 306 U.S. 363, 61 S.Ct. 133, 83 L.Ed. 763 (1938).
11. 203 La. 649, 14 So. (2d) 475 (1943).
12. This act is typical of the "take up" clauses which were passed by
several states for the purpose of taking advantage of the 80 per cent credit
allowed under the provisions of the Federal Revenue Act of 1926. The usual
provision of these clauses is that whenever the amount of all inheritance
1946]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
would terminate this uncertainty and make clear the position of
the United States Supreme Court on the subject.
However, when the case was appealed to the Supreme Court
(under the title of Flournoy v. Wiener 3 ) the majority treated
the case, in substance, as one in which there was an independent
state ground of decision below, which rendered it unnecessary
to determine the question of whether the federal statute violated
the Fifth Amendment. A final decision of the question was thus
delayed, until such time as a direct enforcement of the provision
should be attempted.1
4
The question again came before the court in Fernandez v.
Wiener, 5 a case involving the same succession. The constitu-
tionality of Section 402 (b) (2) was placed directly at issue. The
heirs of Sam Wiener had filed a federal estate tax return, in
which they reported only one-half of the net value of the commu-
nity property as subject to the tax. The commissioner assessed
a deficiency in estate tax based upon the failure to include in
the gross estate the entire value of all community property. "
The deficiency was paid, and when a claim for refund was re-
jected, the present suit was brought to recover the amount of
the deficiency payment. It was not contended that there had
been a misapplication or misconstruction of the statute. The
sole ground upon which recovery was sought was the alleged
unconstitutionality of the enactment.
taxes paid to the state Is less than 80 per cent of the estate tax payable to the
United States under the Federal Revenue Act, the difference between that
amount and the 80 per cent will be paid to the state. What brought the
new community property provision of the federal law into the state case
was the collector's contention that all community property was to be included
in computing the federal tax under the 1926 act for purposes of determining
the amount of the 80 per cent credit.
13. 321 U.S. 253, 64 S.Ct. 548, 88 L.Ed. 708 (1944).
14. It is interesting to note, in connection with that case, the expression
of opinion by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the question of the constitu-
tionality of Section 402(b)(2): "It is obvious, therefore, that the interpreta-
tion sought here with respect to Section 402(b) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1942
is to the same effect as that sought with reference to Act No. 119 of 1932,
that is, the inclusion of his wife's property in the taxable estate of the F41th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." (Italics supplied.) Suc-
cession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 662, 14 So. (2d) 475, 479 (1943).
15. 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 147 (U.S. 1945).
16. The commissioner also included in the gross estate of the decedent
the entire proceeds of fifteen policies of insurance on the life of decedent,
which had been effected by decedent during the marriage with community
funds, as beneficiary. The validity of Section 404 of the Revenue Act of
1942, under which the commissioner acted, was also challenged. The court
upheld the validity of this section of the act along with that of Section
402(b) (2).
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Constitutionality of Section 402(b)(2)
As has been pointed out, the amendment in question was
enacted in the hope that its constitutionality was assured under
the Tyler and Jacobs decisions, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court had previously held in cases involving the community
property relationship that inclusion of the income of the entire
community in a computation of the income tax of one of the
spouses amounted to a tax upon one person for property owned
by another, and thus was a deprivation of due process. 17
In the Tyler and Jacobs cases the Court upheld the action
of Congress in substituting for the test of transfer or extinguish-
ment of proprietary interests that of the "shifting of economic
interests" as a basis for taxation under that provision of the
estate tax relating to joint tenancies and tenancies by the en-
tirety. The Court stated in the Tyler case that under a tenancy
by the entirety the wife's rights were inseparably intermingled
with those of her husband and that the far greater privileges and
extent of ownership which she gained at the death of her hus-
band could legitimately become the basis for estate taxation.
The issue, as stated by the Court, was not whether there had
been, in the strict sense of the word, an actual transfer of prop-
erty by the death of the decedent, but whether the death had
"brought into being or ripened for the survivor property rights
of such character as to make appropriate the imposition of a tax
upon that result, to be measured in whole or in part by the value
of such rights. '18 In the Jacobs case, the Court refused to dis-
tinguish a joint tenancy from a tenancy by the entirety and held
that the change in ownership occurring at the death of one joint
tenant was a sufficient "event" for the levying of an estate tax
measured by the entire joint estate, thus employing the same
method of reasoning set forth in the Tyler case.
The Court, in the Wiener case, applied exactly the same test
in holding that the statute was constitutional and that Congress
might validly impose an estate tax measured by the value of the
entire community upon the death of one of the spouses.
It must be conceded that the power of Congress to levy a
tax upon a transfer of economic benefits is a well established
proposition.'" Whether or not there was justification for holding
that the community property relationship was such that the death
of one of the spouses would effect a transfer of interests sub-
17. See cases cited supra note 3.
18. 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1929).
19. See cases cited supra note 4.
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stantial enough to support such a tax was the sole issue before
the Court in this case.
The technical distinctions between the Louisiana community
property system and joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety
are too numerous and too well known to merit discussion here.
However, the most significant and determinative of these differ-
ences is the fact that in the case of joint tenancies and tenancies
by the entirety neither party has power of testamentary disposi-
tion over any part of the estate before the death of the other. In
both tenancies, the doctrine of survivorship prevails, the interest
of decedent automatically vesting in the survivor.0 Under the
Louisiana community property regime, however, each spouse has
power of testamentary disposition over one-half of the commu-
nity, neither spouse having any right of survivorship in the half
of the other.21 Whether or not the practical differences between
these two situations is great enough to merit the application of
different tax rules has been a much discussed question.
To apply the test set forth in the Jacobs and Tyler decisions
in determining whether or not there actually is a shift of eco-
nomic interests under the community property system, suppose
first a situation where the husband predeceases his wife. In
this case, there is a cessation of his power of management over
the wife's half of the community. However, in a group of test
income tax cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1930,22 it
was pointed out that the husband was no more than an agent of
the community, and that he had been given these powers purely
in the interests of a wise administration of the community. In
defining the nature of the husband's powers as agent, the court
in one of the cases, Bender v. Pfaif, stated:
"While the husband is the manager of the affairs of the mar-
ital partnership, the limitations upon the wrongful exercise
of his power over community property are more stringent
than in many states which have a community system. In
Louisiana, if the husband proves, by reason of financial diffi-
culties or the like, an unfit manager, the wife may bring about
an immediate dissolution and liquidation of the community
property. And when the wife sues for a separation of the
20. Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 6, at 199, § 419.
21. See Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1945)
95-101, c. xvi.
22. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252 (1930); Goodell
v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 51 S.Ct. 62, 75 L.Ed. 247 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282
U.S. 122, 51 S.Ct. 62, 75 L.Ed. 249 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.CL
58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930).
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property, she is entitled to an accounting from the husband
for community income or property in his hands and to reim-
bursement and retribution for any act done by him in fraud
of her rights.""2
The Court in the Wiener case concedes that the interest of
the wife is vested, exactly as was set forth in these decisions, and
admits the foregoing limitations upon the power of the husband.
Nonetheless, despite these decisions, as a practical matter, it is
clear that the husband is not seriously limited in his disposition
of the community and that the cessation of management by the
death of the husband is a definite "excisable event," so far as an
actual transfer of economic interests is concerned.
However, the doctrine of the Jacobs and Tyler cases becomes
extremely weak when applied in a situation where the wife pre-
deceases the husband. In this situation, there is not even the
cessation of bare management upon which to "hang" a tax. The
husband has gained for the first time the right to have his prop-
erty separated from that of his wife. Yet, as a practical matter,
has the husband actually enjoyed a gain? The property over
which he formerly had full control, with power of disposition in
any manner in which he should deem fit (subject however to cer-
tain limitations which will be hereinafter enumerated), is now
divided, and one-half of the community passes to the heirs of
the wife. The husband, having lost control and power of man-
agement and enjoyment over his wife's share of the community,
may no longer sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise alienate the
property except insofar as his own undivided half is concerned. 24
The Court, in this connection, finding that the husband did
gain some economic interest upon the death of the wife, stated:
"... her death, by ending the marital community, liberates
her husband's share from the restrictions which the existence
of the community had placed upon his control of it. ' 25
Aside from a certain moral duty to the wife to act prudently and
in good faith, it would seem that the husband has never actually
been restricted in the disposition of his half of the community
property during the existence of the community. While he may
not separate his own half of the property from that of his wife,
yet for purposes of selling or otherwise disposing of it, he could
convey a perfectly good title of all or any part of the community.
23. 282 U.S. 127, 132, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252, 254 (1930).
24. See Daggett, loc. cit. supra note 21.
25. Fernandez v. Wiener, 66 S.Ct. 178, 186, 90 L.Ed. 147, 157 (U.S. 1945).
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The Civil Code lays down certain restrictions on the husband's
power of disposition. He may not dispose of the immovables
gratuitously, unless it be for the establishment of children of the
marriage, and he may not give away all or a quota of the mov-
ables. However, in case of a violation of the provisions, the wife
may not assert her claim of injury until a dissolution of the com-
munity has been effected.20 At that time, the damage done to her
half of the property must be repaired by the husband. His half
of the community is in no way affected thereby.
The court further stated:
"The precept that the wife is equal co-owner with her hus-
band of community property undoubtedly calls into play with-
in the marital relationship personal and psychological forces
which have great importance in the practical determination
of how community property shall be managed by the husband.
Though it may be impossible fully to translate these impon-
derables into legal rules, the death of the wife undoubtedly
brings, in every practical aspect, greater freedom to the hus-
band in his disposition of that share of community property
which is technically his, than is to be gathered solely from
a reading of statutes and case law."
27
Indefinite though this "psychological factor" may be, yet the
court finds that it, together with whatever freedom from re-
strictions the husband has gained upon the death of his wife, is
substantial enough to warrant the imposition of a tax.
The amendment is fortified by a provision which allows a
deduction for any part of the community which may be shown
to have been received for personal services rendered by the sur-
viving spouse, or to have been derived originally from such com-
pensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse.
However, because of the difficulty of proof of the origin of such
funds, in the absence of regularly kept records, the majority of
people would not now be able to take advantage of the provision.
The amendment stipulates: "In no case shall such interest be
less than the value of such part of the community as was sub-
ject to decedent's power of testamentary disposition." Thus, the
maximum credit is fifty per cent of the community at death.
The court's conclusion was further fortified by the old, al-
most forgotten, case of Moffitt v. Kelley,28 decided in 1910. In
26. See also Daggett, loc. cit. supra note 21; Id. at 57-70, c. xi.
27. 66 S.Ct. 178, 186, 90 L.Ed. 147, 157 (U.S. 1945).
28. Moffltt v. Kelley, 218 U.S. 400, 31 S.Ct. 79, 54 L.Ed. 1086 (1910).
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that case, a wife was forced to pay an inheritance tax on her
half of the community, upon the death of her husband, under a
California statute covering all property passing from any person
who "may die seized or possessed of same." The Supreme Court
held that a state did have the power to include the entire com-
munity in such a case without thereby violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. There was some doubt, at the time this case was
decided, as to whether or not the wife in California actually had
a present vested interest in the community. The court, however,
made it clear that its disposition of the case would have been the
same under either situation.
Under the estate taxation principles laid down by the Wiener
case, Louisiana and the other community property states will
henceforth share the burden equally with the other states of the
union. It will be noted, however, the principal case does not es-
tablish a precedent for income taxation, 29 as the previous income
tax cases were not overruled. The court did not find it necessary
to distinguish them. Legislation would be required, as matters
stand, to effect a change in that field of taxation. In view of the
fact that changes will very likely be presented for congressional
approbation in the near future, the community property states
may well weigh the merits of joining in an attempt to work out
a fair statutory adjustment of the problem, rather than standing
adamant in opposition to any change which would destroy the
present income tax advantages of their people.
MARTHA E. KIRK
PRESENT INSANITY- ITS SCOPE AND DETERMINATION
Under Article 261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there
are four special pleas open to an accused in a criminal trial in
Louisiana. Included in these is the plea of insanity, which has
two separate and distinct aspects: insanity at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime and insanity at the time of the
trial. The two have often been confused and, as a result, Louisi-
ana jurisprudence on the subject presents a varied and conflict-
29. It is interesting to note that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has
accorded income tax recognition to the Oklahoma mandatory community
property law, which became effective July 27, 1945. The bureau specifically
holds that income earned and received after that date is community income,
and one-half may be reported by each spouse. Prentice-Hall, 1946 Fed. Tax.
Serv. J 76,087 (Jan. 18, 1946).
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